Predictions for US-Iran Conflict

Predictions for US-Iran Conflict Using “The Science of War” Framework

The Governing Fivefold Chain (孙子五行)

1. Framework: The vertical chain links:
1. Political (道 – Unity/Legitimacy):

Iran: over 24 million people signed up to fight for the flag

USA: about 62% of voters disapprove of this Iran war, without the support from allies (such as NATO)

2. Knowledge (知 – Intelligence/Assessment)

USA expects the regime change but failed and not expecting that Iran will and can control Hormuz straits.

3. War Dynamics (兵法五行), see below
4. Physical Facts (地理 – Terrain/Weather)

Iran: high mountains, difficult for ground war, easy to hide military force underground.

US bases: on open field, difficult to defend

Iran: easily control Hormuz straits

5. Tactics (战术 – Execution)

USA: bluffing (to destroy the Iran civilization).

 

The War-Dynamics Cycle (兵法五行)

• Framework: a closed loop of five paired variables:
1. 众/寡 (Mass/Scarcity)

Taking 2 to 3 defense missiles to shoot down one incoming missile.

(US base + Israel) = 25,000 square kilometers vs 1.6 million square kilometers.

{8 million Israeli + 50,000 US troops} vs 93 million Iranians.

2. 治/乱 (Order/Disorder)

Iran: easily control Hormuz straits

USA: unable to defend Gulf allies, unable to open Hormuz straits military thus far

3. 虚/实 (Hollow/Solid)

Iran: 90% of military are underground

USA: the munitions logistics are difficult.

4. 形/势 (Form/Potential)

Iran: the controlling Hormuz straits affects the globe economy

USA: unable to open Hormuz straits with military means.

5. 奇/正 (Unorthodox/Orthodox)

Iran: retaliate the Gulf States (undefendable) if being attacked.

The framework from The Science of War (Gong’s dual interlocking 五行 systems) provides a structured way to assess this conflict. Gong’s analysis captures key asymmetries effectively. Here are some additions and refinements based on the book’s logic (vertical governing chain + horizontal war-dynamics cycle), current realities as of May 2026 (fragile ceasefire, ongoing Hormuz standoff, no regime change), and the text’s emphasis on transformations between paired states.

From the Governing Fivefold Chain (Vertical Chain)

This links Political (道) → Knowledge (知) → War Dynamics (兵法五行) → Physical Facts (地理) → Tactics (战术). Higher levels dominate lower ones; failure at the top (道) undermines everything below.

1. Political (道 – Unity/Legitimacy): Strong point for Iran. Massive volunteer mobilization and rally-around-the-flag effect align with Sunzi’s emphasis on 道 as popular alignment with leadership. US side shows clear domestic division (majority disapproval, viewed as benefiting Israel more). Lack of broad NATO/ally buy-in further weakens US 道.

 

2. Knowledge (知 – Intelligence/Assessment): US overestimated regime fragility and underestimated Iranian resilience/control of Hormuz + asymmetric options. Iran appears to have better assessed US domestic constraints and global economic leverage. Per the book, poor 知 leads to miscalculation of 可胜 (exploitable victory).
3. War Dynamics: See expanded cycle below.
4. Physical Facts (地理 – Terrain/Weather/Logistics): Gong’s points are solid (Iranian mountains/underground facilities vs. exposed US bases; Hormuz chokepoint). Add: Iran’s dispersed, hardened assets convert difficult terrain into sanctuary (classic 地利). US logistics across vast distances create vulnerabilities in sustainment, especially with missile/drone threats.
5. Tactics (战术 – Execution): US emphasis on standoff strikes and bluffs fits orthodox power projection but struggles against Iranian unorthodox retaliation (proxies, mining, swarming). Iran’s threats to Gulf states exploit undefendable targets.

Overall vertical assessment: Iran holds stronger 道, which cascades advantages downward despite material inferiority. US excels in tangible 形 (firepower) but faces friction propagating that into decisive 势.

 

From the War-Dynamics Cycle (Horizontal 兵法五行)

This closed loop of paired transformations (众/寡, 治/乱, 虚/实, 形/势, 奇/正) highlights how states evolve into opposites.

• 众/寡 (Mass/Scarcity): Iran’s population + dispersed forces create effective mass in defense/asymmetry. US/Israel superior in precision munitions but face scarcity in political will, munitions sustainability (high expenditure rates), and acceptable targets. The missile exchange ratio Gong noted illustrates costly attrition for the superior side.
• 治/乱 (Order/Disorder): Iran maintains internal command cohesion and disrupts Gulf shipping/order. US struggles to impose order on the strait or protect allies without escalation costs. Hormuz control gives Iran leverage to create regional disorder.
• 虚/实 (Hollow/Solid): Iran’s underground/dispersed posture (虚 in visibility, 实 in resilience) is textbook. US bases and logistics chains appear 实 but prove hollow against sustained harassment. Munitions/logistics strain adds hollowness.
• 形/势 (Form/Potential): Critical Sunzi distinction. US has superior visible 形 (military hardware, strikes) but struggles to convert it into 势 (decisive momentum toward regime change or secure straits). Iran’s control of Hormuz turns limited 形 into global economic 势. Gong’s framework critiques modern doctrines for over-focusing on 形 while under-modeling 势 transformations.

 

• 奇/正 (Unorthodox/Orthodox): Iran masters 奇 (asymmetric retaliation via proxies, maritime threats, economic disruption). US relies more on 正 (conventional strikes, blockade). The cycle allows 奇 to become 正 and vice versa over time.

Cycle insight: These pairs are mutually immanent and transformable. Iran has cycled weaknesses (military 形) into strengths (economic 势, disorder), while US strengths risk turning into political drain.

 

Predictions Using This Framework

Applying Gong’s logic (which emphasizes calculating conditions for 不可胜 first, then exploiting 可胜; avoiding protracted war; and shaping 势):

• Short-to-medium term (next months): Stalemate or managed de-escalation likely. Neither side achieves decisive victory. Iran cannot defeat US/Israel militarily but can sustain costs via Hormuz leverage and 奇 tactics. US domestic 道 limits appetite for prolonged ground involvement or open-ended blockade. Ceasefire extensions or partial deals probable, but Hormuz tensions persist as a bargaining chip.

 

• US challenges: Without strong 道 and ally unity, converting tactical 形 advantages into strategic success is difficult. Protracted conflict risks self-weakening (economic blowback, domestic opposition)—echoing Sunzi warnings.
• Iran advantages: Stronger 道 + geography + 势 creation position it to "win by not losing." Regime survival (core goal) appears achievable; it has imposed global costs disproportionate to its military losses.
• Longer term: Iran likely emerges weakened militarily but politically resilient, with enhanced narrative of resistance. US/Israel achieve degradation of capabilities but fall short of regime change or secure energy flows without ongoing costs. Best outcome for US would be a negotiated off-ramp that restores some strait access while claiming degradation successes. Worst: escalation drains US 势 further.

This aligns with the book’s retrodictions on Vietnam/Afghanistan: superior material power (形) does not guarantee victory when 道, 势, and political sustainability are misaligned. The framework predicts outcomes based on condition transformations rather than raw power.

Caveats: Real wars include fog, chance, and leadership decisions not fully captured in any model. Gong’s approach excels at high-level diagnosis and highlighting leverage points.

 

For the book “The Science of War”, it is available at https://tienzengong.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/2ndscience-of-war.pdf